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MEDICAID FORECASTING
PRACTICES1
Dan Williams
Baruch College
January 27, 1998
COMPARING MEDICAID FORECASTS
Applied forecasting literature includes numerous
studies in which different approaches are compared
through simulated forecasting such as the M-competition, the M-2 Competition, and the M-3 Competition
(Makridakis, et. a l, 1982; Makridakis el. al., 1989;
Hibon and Makridakis, 1997) Less frequently, studies
compare different actual forecasts of the same data se
ries (Ashley, 1988); however, because of the small
number of such multiple forecasts, there is limited op
portunity to evaluate sources of variation.
State government forecasting provides an opportu
nity for studying a large number of forecasts of similar
series to determine the effects of different variables on
forecasting practice. Often, many states forecast simi
lar series, such as tax revenue, nursing home bed need,
prison population, or educational enrollment. While
some characteristics of these series differ from state to
state other characteristics may be similar. For exam
ple, the unit of analysis may be similar between states each state might be interested in dollars of revenue, a
count of children at each age cohort, and so forth.
Also, the series in each state may experience the simi
lar social and political perturbances at about the same
time. The study of these such forecasts may provide
insight about variables that affect applied forecasting.
This paper examines forecasting activities among
Medicaid agencies in the fifty United States, Wash
ington, D C., and five U.S. territories (American Sa
moa, Guam, Puerto Rico, Northern Mariana Islands,
and Virgin Islands). Most frequently, studies of state or
local forecasting practice focus on revenue forecasting
(Rodgers and Joyce, 1996; Bretschneider and Schroeder, 1988; Bretschneider. et. a l, 1989). There are
several reasons why comparison of state Medicaid
forecast practice may be better than comparison of state
revenue forecasting practices First, there is no con
sistent reporting of state revenue estimates. States
make forecasts when it suits them and report them in a
manner that is satisfactory to their governors or legis
latures. Collection of data through national organiza
tions such as the National Association of State Budget
Officers is not so rigorous as to assure that reported
1This research is supported by PSC CUNY grant number 666546

data are comparable. In contrast, Medicaid agencies
must report their expenditure estimates to the federal
government using the federally specified HCFA-37
form once a quarter beginning roughly 30 months be
fore the end of each federal fiscal year.2
Second, determining the accuracy of state revenue
forecasts relies on the validity of state reported differ
ences between planned and actual expenditure. States
may be politically motivated to report these data in a
favorable manner. By contrast, Medicaid forecasts,
can be compared with accounting data as reported on a
federal report known as the HCFA-64. While these
data may not be bias free,3 biases are likely to be small
and similar from state to state.
MEDICAID FORECASTING BACKGROUND
Medicaid is a federal and state funded health care
financing program. The federal government contrib
utes 50% to 83% of the cost of the program in each
state, with states contributing the balance. Medicaid is
the largest human services program in state budgets,
accounting for 19.2% of total state spending in 1995.
It is second only to education in share of state general
funds, and has the largest share of federal transfer
payments to states (National Association of State
Budget Officers. 1996). Medicaid is an entitlement
program: once states establish rules about who is en
rolled and what is cov ered they are barred from refus
ing to enroll eligible individuals or from refusing to
pay for covered services due to funding shortfalls.
Medicaid pays for health care through vendor pay
ments to health care suppliers (called “providers” by
some states). Beneficiaries present their Medicaid
cards to enrolled suppliers who deliver services and
submit claims to state Medicaid agencies. The state
Medicaid agencies pay for these services based on
“provider agreements,” which set payment conditions.
As a result, the Medicaid agency is usually the last to
find out about the service. For these reasons, Medicaid
budgeting is highly dependent on forecasting.
Because the Medicaid program is funded with both
state and federal funds, there are two levels of govern
ment who use Medicaid forecasts for budgeting. Prac
tices at these levels of government can be somewhat
1 The number of quarter* from first reporting a fiscal year to the end of
that year has varied from time to time.
’ Slates may not anticipate retrospective adjustments in the HCFA-37
although they appear in HCFA-64. Another disadvantage o f comparing
state forecasting practice using HCFA-37 data is that states may be
more interested in their own budgets than in the reporting o f their ex
pectations to the federal government. So, the HCFA-37 may not capture
the stale's best forecast.

277

different. In a typical state government, a Medicaid
administering agency makes a forecast that is submit
ted to an executive budget office for review. Some
times the executive budget office makes its own inde
pendent forecast which may be combined with, or sub
stituted for, the Medicaid agency’s forecast (JLARC,
1997) This forecast is then submitted to the state leg
islature in the legislative budget process. The legisla
ture may make another forecast or may choose to rely
on the executive forecast. There can be various mixed
practices, for example, a legislative agency may par
ticipate in selecting the executive forecast.
The federal government uses the state forecasts in
a different way. The states submit their estimates to
the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA),
the federal agency responsible for administering the
Medicaid grants to states, each quarter using a federal
form, the HCFA-37 (formerly the HCFA-25). Fore
casts reported on this form are combined to produce
national estimates. The federal government adjusts
these estimates: (a) to account for new federal policy
making that the states could not have known about
when making their estimates; and (b) to correct for
perceived patterns of errors occurring in past forecasts
(Trapnell, 1991). The federal government uses these
corrected forecasts to estimate federal Medicaid outlays
for the next future federal budget year. Estimates for
years beyond those reported in the HCFA-37 are made
by the HCFA Office of Actuary using algorithms de
veloped by a contractor prior to 1980 (Trapnell, 1991).
In the federal budgeting practice, HCFA budget esti
mates originating either from the states or the Office of
Actuary are subject to scrutiny by OMB and CBO.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s Medicaid agen
cies experienced several years of significant forecast
error. In 1991 HCFA was criticized for unprecedented
overages in the Medicaid budget (HHS NEWS, 1991;
Executive Office of the President and Department of
Health & Human Services, 1991). At that time, the
federal government concluded that state forecasting
was a significant source of forecasting error (HHS
NEWS, 1991). Medicaid and related health care fore
casting and cost estimation have been the center of
continued disagreement and concern throughout the
1990s (Rich, 1991; Firshein, 1993; Doran, Roesenblatt,
and Yamamoto, 1994; Office of Technology Assess
ment, 1994; Holahan and Liska, December, 1996; Ratner, 1997; Scanlon, 1997; Holahan and Liska, 1997).

EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF MEDICAID PRAC
TICE
“Forecasting Techniques and Budgetary Issues of
State Medicaid Programs" (McKusick, 1980) examines
the forecasting practices of 10 state Medicaid pro
grams. Data are gathered from site visits. McKusick
observes, “Although each state’s estimating techniques
are unique, there are patterns that are common to most
methodologies.” These common patterns include
• States attempt to estimate demand for service, and
pay little attention to supply of service.
• Most state forecasts are prepared on a cash budg
eting basis although some forecast accruals and
convert to a cash basis.
•
In many circumstances, reimbursement rate in
crease decisions are known prior to budgeting and
can be used as an aid to expenditure forecasting
• Many states have poor quality data sources, but
they compensate through inventive use of fore
casting techniques.
• Forecasting is understaffed in many states, leaving
“many critical forecast issues . . . unanalyzed ”
• Few states relate economic conditions to enroll
ment. Where they do, such analyses may be pri
marily produced for other governmental functions
• State Medicaid budget estimates are “determined
by the political process,” with frequent reliance on
supplemental appropriations.
• States forecast no more than a two years horizon.
• States rely on trend analysis, rather than “looking
for the underlying driving forces in medical costs.”
• Some state forecasts submitted to the HCFA are
consistent with their state budget estimates, while
others are “the best guess of the analyst.”
McKusick describes specific practices in each of
10 states (California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachu
setts, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas,
Virginia and Wisconsin). Details are not summarized
here. The matters he addresses include: the partici
pants in forecasting, the general forecasting approach
(e.g., California divides the forecast into current serv
ices and policy modifications), number of periodic ob
servations available to the forecast model, level of data
(annual, monthly, etc ), sources of data, forecasting
techniques used, degree of data decomposition, fre
quency of forecasting, the state budget calendar, ability
to produce data reports for the federal government,
relative size of the Medicaid program (to other Medi
caid programs nationwide), breadth of Medicaid cover
age, and components of Medicaid coverage. Some of
the techniques observed include: use of regression or
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systems of regression models, analysis of “historical
trends," use of a weighted average of inflation factor,
use of judgment, use of graphing techniques, use of
nursing home bed supply information, and use of ne
gotiated rates (Texas).
Because of the interaction with the political proc
ess, McKusick expects that states arc motivated to un
derestimate expenditures, however, he observes, “[We]
are puzzled that the aggregate of all state estimates
should have proven accurate in the past since many
have incentives to estimate low and none appear to
have incentives to estimate high.”
McKusick does not attempt to establish a relation
ship between these observations and relative forecast
ing accuracy’.
“Better Management for Better Medicaid Esti
mates," (Executive Office of the President, 1991) re
ports that from 1980 to 1990 the overall average error
of state estimates is -0.3%; however, the federal gov
ernment is concerned because of error and expected
error for 1990 through 1992 as shown in Table 1

Year
1990
1991
1992

Table 1
Error
-9.2%
-18.0%
-16.0%

Comment
Actual
Expected
Expected

HCFA determined that in 1990, 19 states had er
rors greater than 10% and 4 (Alabama, Kansas, Ari
zona and Massachusetts) had errors greater than 20%.
Error rates for the largest states grew from below 5%
in 1990 to an unweighted average of 17% in 1991 as
follows: Texas - 21%, New York - 17%, and Califor
nia - 7%, for a gross total of $2.1 billion.
A HCFA/OMB task force visited nine large states
that account for approximately 50% of all Medicaid
expenditure in 1991 and 1992 (Alabama, California,
Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Texas). They found: “Mis-estimates
in these States appear to be due primarily to changes in
Federal. .. policies. . . . Only about one-third of the
mis-cstimates were attributable to problems in the
States’ estimating processes. Economic trends appear
to play a lesser role.” Programmatic sources of cost
increase include health care inflation, court orders, and
use of provider taxes and refundable donations. Spe
cific observations about state processes include:4

•

Some States have well qualified personnel
and employ sophisticated estimating
models; others do not.
• Slates that link Medicaid estimating to
their State budget processes appear to
produce more accurate estimates than
those that do not.
• Many States do not take reporting to the
Federal Government. . . seriously, and
thus do not provide accurate, complete or
timely estimates.
• Many States do not provide the Federal
Government with the assumptions used in
making estimates. No distinction is made
between baseline estimates and program
estimates
• Technical problems include differences in
fiscal years and State use of accrued ver
sus cash budgeting. (Executive Office of
the President, 1991)
Some of these observations involve communica
tion problems between the state and federal govern
ments. Observations that appear to account for fore
casting accuracy include (1) the assertion that fore
caster qualification varies, and (2) the observation that
states who link state and federal budgeting seem to
provide the federal government better forecasts. Evi
dence is not presented
Gordon R. Trapncll examined Medicaid forecast
ing in the early 1990s and produced two reports
(Trapnell, 1991; Trapncll, 1994). The 1991 stud)’ re
ports empirical findings. It serves two purposes, one is
to explain particular forecast errors occurring in 1991
and 1992 (as anticipated in 1991). The other is to pro
vide some insight into the federal use of state forecasts.
While this discussion reveals some familiarity with
particular practices of some states, it does not show
comparison of actual practices and their forecasting
casting consequences among the states. Trapnell’s
data collection method is not revealed, it appears that
he relies primarily on information already in the hands
of HCFA. His observations regarding state practices
are as follows:'1
• Variation in forecasting accuracy may relate to
composition of Medicaid beneficiary enrollment.
• State legislators may choose to implement new
polices that are underestimated, that is, where po
litical pressure for policies is high in relation to
4 Trapnell attributes some of these observations to McKusick's study
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the determined costs.
States may defer spending at the end of a state fis
cal year to ensure that state fiscal year estimates
are correct. This can happen because many states
budget on a cash basis rather than an accrual ba
sis.
• Data available for forecasting in some states may
be of poor quality or may not be reconciled with
actual expenditure experience.
• Past federal action may discourage states from re
vealing their true estimates. In particular, in 1982
the federal government penalized states whose
actual expenditures exceeded their forecasts. As a
consequence, states may be motivated to overstate
their estimates.
• There is wide variety in the sophistication of state
forecasting from “trended forward total aggregate
spending by type of service" to “fully specified
econometric model. . . . refitted quarterly.”
• Only a few states fully disaggregate data by the
type of service and type of beneficiary.
• Locus of responsibility varies among the states,
with Medicaid agencies preparing some forecasts,
while budget officials preparing others
• There is “some correlation between how well offi
cials understood the programs and the details in
corporated in the cost estimates.”
•
State forecasts improve as the horizon between
forecast and the end of the fiscal year diminish.
•
States may not reconcile state and federal fiscal
year reporting (most state fiscal years are from
July to June, while the federal fiscal year is from
October to September).
Trapnell's analysis of state variation is limited to
two paragraphs of his report in which he compares re
gional aggregate variation between the HCFA-37 and
HCFA-64 reports. He finds that states in Region i
(states in each region are shown in Table 2) consis
tently underestimates its expenditures, states in Region
2 generally overestimate expenditures and states in Re
gion 9 arc usually very accurate. Trapnell’s report
makes no effort to account for these variations in accu
racy. However, the most obvious characteristic of re
gions Trapnell mentions as having consistent patterns
of accuracy are that they are dominated by a single
state New York accounts for about 85% of federal ex
penditures in Region 2 and California accounts for a
similar amount in Region 9 In Region 1, Massachu
•

setts5 accounts for about 60% of federal expenditures
It is likely that the explanation for the various fore
casting results in these three regions will be found at
these three states.
Table 2
Region 1
Connecticut
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Vermont
Region 3
DC.
Delaware
Maryland
Pennsylvania
Virginia
West Virginia

Region 5
Illinois
Indiana
Michigan
Minnesota
Ohio
Wisconsin
Region 7
Iowa
Kansas
Missouri
Nebraska

Region 2
New Jersey
New York
Puerto Rico
Virgin Islands

Region 4
Alabama
Florida
Georgia
Kentucky
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina
Tennessee
Region 6
Arkansas
Louisiana
New Mexico
Oklahoma
Texas

Region 8
Colorado
Montana
North Dakota
South Dakota
Utah
Wyoming
Region 9
Region 10
American Samoa Alaska
Arizona
daho
California
Oregon
Guam
Washington
Hawaii
Northern Mariana
Nevada
Michele Insco of the Colorado state government
conducted a Medicaid budget survey and circulated re
5 Massachusetts has two Medicaid agencies, the smaller of which is
about
of the program This analysis excludes the smaller agency

suits to participating states in May, 1992 (Insco, 1992).
This study consists of charts demonstrating factors that
might affect forecast accuracy or expenditure values.
Some variables charted include: state population, per
cent change in Medicaid expenditure from FY 91 to
FY 92, characteristics of the Medicaid program in
cluding various policy factors of current interest in
1992, basis of accounting, and beginning/ending dates
of state fiscal year. Some of the characteristics re
ported include the percent of poverty at which pregnant
women and certain children meet eligibility criteria,
experience with Boren Amendment lawsuits,6 percent
age of births in the state covered by Medicaid, coverage
of certain optional populations, etc. There is no ac
companying written report to interpret these charts. By
implication, these variables are thought to bear a rela
tionship to expenditures and forecast accuracy.
The Human Services Finance Officers sponsored a
survey of Medicaid budget estimation methods by
Deborah J. Lower (1993). Lower reports that her sur
vey is an extension of the Insco survey and is aimed at
“determining what techniques were being used in other
states to assist them in responding to legislative and
executive branch questions.” Lower surveyed the 50
US States and D.C., and reports a response rate of 84%
(43 states). Lower’s study focuses on identifying prac
tices rather than determining sources of variation.
Lower does not attempt to evaluate the relationship
between these practices and forecast success. Practices
she finds are as follows.
General:
• States use their own forecasts as compared with
contracting out forecasting functions.
• Staff time required to complete the HCFA-37
ranged from 0.1 to 15 FTE and averaged at 1.6
FTE. (The phrasing of this question appears to
limit the this response to completion of the form,
and may exclude time required for forecasting.)
• The HCFA-37 may be completed in differing cate
gories than state budget forecasts.
• Technical background of staff completing the
HCFA-37 or related forecasts includes actuarial
science, accounting, budget, statistics, pro
gram/policy analy sis, economics, management
* The Boren Amendment is language in Title XIX of the Social Security
Act that allows states to pay institutional health care providers for effi
cient delivery of health care. It is widely held that the amendment was
originally passed to allow states to avoid paying excessive amounts to
hospitals and nursing homes. However, courts have interpreted it to
prohibit stales from paying hospitals and nursing homes too little. The
Boren Amendment was repealed in 1997.

analysis and demographics.
Budget office staff ranged from 1 to 44 employees
and averaged at 7.8 FTE.
• Primary responsibility for the Medicaid budget is
with budget or finance agencies in 17 states and
program or departmental administrators or staff 25
states.
• Twenty-six states report formal relationships be
tween budget and finance staff and program staff
• Program staff have access to expenditure data in
35 states.
•
Some states report that program staff do not have
adequate technical skills for forecasting.
• States report that Medicaid accounts for 4% to
52% of slate budgets, averaging at 15.96%.
• Forty states report the existence of written guber
natorial guidance in budget preparation.
Caseload Projections:
• Thirty-seven states use data concerning eligi
bility (enrolled beneficiaries).
• Thirty-one states evaluate population catego
ries.
• Twenty-seven states evaluate federal mandates
for impact on enrollment.
• Twenty-three states use “program specific in
formation."
• Five states evaluate the impact of “retroactiv e
eligibility.”7
• Twenty-eight states report that they forecast
based on cash data (expenditures on date of
claims payment).
• Eight states report that they forecast based on
accrual (service date) data.
• Four states report use of both cash and accrual
data.
• Six states report lack of access to “extract
data.”
• Lag lime between service date and payment
date is variable between states and between
service categories.
• The predominant periodicity of data is
monthly.
• The average length of a forecasted data series
is 5 years.
Utilization
• Nineteen states report estimating utilization
directly from enrolled beneficiaries.
• Twelve states report using an intermediate
•

’ Retroactive eligibility is the awarding o f eligibility for a period that is
in the past
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•
•

determination of sendee recipients.
Eleven states report use of both techniques.
Eighteen states use seasonal adjustments for
some services.

•
•
•
•

Price Level

States uses price indexes such as CPI or local
indexes.
•
States evaluate the impact of lawsuits.
• Historical patterns may not be evaluated.
• Thirty-seven states evaluate price level change
by sendee type.
• Twenty-one states evaluate price level change
by eligibility category.
• Eight states evaluate price level change by
other demographic categories.
Frequency of forecasts:
• Sixteen states report updating forecasts quar
terly.
• Ten states report updating forecasts “as
needed.”
Software Usage includes:
•
Spreadsheets (Lotus, Excel, Quattro Pro)
•
Statistical software (SAS, SPSS)
• Forecast software (Forecast Pro)
• Mainframe forecasting programs (five states)
Program features:
• Fifteen states report no HMO enrollment.
• Other states report enrollment from 553 to
384,377 (Lower does not provide bases for
percentage calculations).
• Twenty-two states report involvement in
Boren Amendment lawsuits.
• Of thirty-two states reporting data, the per
centage of births reimbursed through Medi
caid ranged from 14% to 56% and averaged at
36.4%.
Data sources used by states to estimate impacts of
new policies include:
• Program information (41 states)
•
Information from other states (40 states)
• Census data (36 states)
• Insurance company consultation (14 states)
• Providers, actuaries, health or research data,
and historical patterns.
Difficulties states report include:
• Last minute program and policy changes
• Accuracy of population growth estimates
• Accuracy of utilization estimates.
• Budgetary constraints (state restrictions vs.
federal mandates).

Data validity.
Technological advancements.
Variation in lag between service date and
payment date.
Retroactive adjustments.

•

It is difficult to compare these empirical studies
because of the small number of agencies studied and
differences in specific matters observed. Yet, some
topics persist. McKusick, Executive Office of the
President (EOP), Insco, and Lower look into whether
forecasts concern cash expenditures or intermediate
accruals, and each finds variation in state practices.
McKusick, EOP, and Lower find variation in staff ca
pacities. McKusick and Trapnell find a relation be
tween Medicaid forecasting and the political environ
ment. McKusick, Trapnell, and Lower find variation
in techniques used, degree of data disaggregation, data
quality, and locus of forecasting responsibility. Also,
they find that many states attempt to account for policy
making that affects Medicaid expenditures. McKusick
and EOP find that some states treat federal forecast re
porting differently than state purpose forecasting.
On most commonly discussed matters, findings are
consistent across the various studies. It is not possible
to determine change over time. For example, McKusick’s data are too vague and his sample too small for
comparison with Lower.
NORMATIVE APPROACHES TO MEDICAID
FORECASTING
Three HCFA guidelines for forecasting are exam
ined: (1) Charts from a presentation on forecasting, (2)
normative guidelines in “Better Management for Better
Medicaid Estimates” (1991), and (3) HCFA-37 re
porting expectations.
HCFA (1990)8 recommends structuring the Medi
caid forecast using of the formula:
E(y+1) = P x U x C
or
E(y+1) = E(y) x (1 + AP) x (1 + AU) x (1 + AC)
where, E(y+1) is the future year expenditure, P is the
projected price, U is the projected utilization,9 C is the
' These guidelines are demonstrated in charts and tables, with limited
narrative discussion.
* With Medicaid, utilization can have several meanings. HCFA offers
two definitions: Service unit per enrolled beneficiary and claims fre
quency. HCFA recommends the earlier
~ definition. This utilization is a
combination of two factors: ratio o f beneficiaries using services
(sometimes called "recipients") to beneficiaries enrolled and ratio of
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projected enrollment of beneficiaries,10 E(y) is the cur
rent year expenditure, and A denotes year to year
change calculated as ((Year 2)- (Year l))/(Year 1).
These formulae are sometimes called the PUC model
(Price, Utilization, and Caseload),11 Sometimes the
first version is called the direct method and the second
is called the incremental method. They provide a
structure for calculating expenditures within each ex
penditure category. Although HCFA suggests that the
direct method is more accurate, some of their material
seems to recommend the use of the indirect method;
perhaps because it is thought that the it is less difficult
to find data supporting the indirect method. HCFA also
recommends adjusting forecasts to reflect cash flow
factors (lag between service date and payment date),
decomposition of data into groups of homogeneous
sub-populations, calculation of marginal-to-core ra
tios,12 and the use of demographic data to help identify
marginal and core groups.
Normative guidelines in “Better Management for
Better Medicaid Estimates" (1991) are primarily di
rected at HCFA. State oriented recommendations in
clude: requiring states to provide baseline (no policy
change) estimates, listing of assumptions underlying
these baseline estimates, and requiring separate esti
mate of expected changes. It is not clear whether the
framers of these guidelines intend that states will make
better forecasts using these guidelines, or merely that
HCFA will have a better change to discovering poor
forecasts.
The HCFA-37 does not explicitly require states to
use any particular approach for forecasting. Never
theless, the form calls for the state to report on various
forecast elements in a manner that is consistent with
the direct method PUC model along with separate re
porting of base line and expected changes. To fulfill
HCFA’s reporting requirements, the state must either

structure its forecast to be consistent with the PUC
model or it must compute PUC model variables from
its actual forecast. Some states refer to this latter op
tion as “backing into" the HCFA forecast. Over time,
the HCFA-37 has also added schedules to capture data
on special issues of interest to the federal government.
For example, at some times HCFA-37 reporting has
included extensive reporting on the use of dispropor
tionate share adjustments to hospitals.1314 Sometimes
these schedules involve reporting anticipated effects of
recently passed federal legislation. The structure of
these schedules may or may not reflect normative
views concerning how HCFA thinks states should es
timate these polic\’ changes.
Trapnell (1991) discusses a variant of the PUC
model that includes the marginal-to-core ratio. This
model disaggregates Medicaid into 29 service catego
ries, which are further decomposed into five compo
nents:H
E(y+l) = E (y )x (l + P (y + l))x (l+ U (y + l))x
(1 + M x C(y+1')
where, E(y+1) is the future year expenditure, E(y) is
the current year expenditure, P(y+1) is the projected
change in price. U(y+1) is the projected change in
utilization, C(y+1) is the projected change in enroll
ment of beneficiaries, and M is the marginal-to-core
factor. Some of these components may require separate
calculation for each enrollment category’. Other com
ponents are essentially static, or are estimated from
sources outside of HCFA.
Trapnell implies that use of this or a similar model
would be the best method for states to forecast Medi
caid expenditure. However, elsewhere he says that the
most important elements of good state forecasting are
use of a skilled and attentive staff working within a
comprehensive analytic framework. The PUC model
serves as the analytic framework.
Trapnell’s “Best Practices Guide for Preparation of
Medicaid Budget Estimates," (1994) presumably re
flects his findings in his 1991 study.15 Most of Trapnell’s advice is general with no special application to
Medicaid. For example, he advises agencies to avoid
expectations of accuracy that cannot be met and to be
sure that outputs address client officials data needs. He

service units to recipients Sometimes "utilization" is used to refer to
one or the other o f these component concepts.
10 HCFA recommends that caseload be measured in average monthly
enrolled beneficiaries per year.
11 Sometimes, owing to a rearrangement of the variables, this model is
called the CUP model.
11 Marginal to core refers to an expectation that incremental element of
enrollment will have a different utilization pattern than the base (core)
enrollment This view can involve several unrelated matters. First,
newly enrolled beneficiaries may have a different usage pattern. It may
take awhile for them to establish relationships with medical care provid
ers, so their usage may be lower. On the other hand, they may be more
urgent to obtain services that have been postponed while they had no
health financing resources, so they may use more services Second, it is
likely that there will be a lag between enrollment and payment for serv
ices. As the federal government budgets on a cash basis, this lag appears
as a reduced cost in the first year o f service.

11 Disproportionate share hospital adjustments have been a source of
friction between states and the federal government since the early 1990s
14 Notation is slightly changed.
15 The author has direct knowledge that Trapnell made site visits to
other states beyond those discussed in the 1991 study.
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recommends evaluating forecasts through production
of numerous outputs that can be compared with actu
als, comparing forecasts with earlier forecasts of the
same series, and making frequent forecast updates. He
recommends usual forms of pre-forecasting such as
disaggregating data and adjusting for non-recurring
events, missing data, and lag time between accrual of
liabilities and cash transactions. He recommends op
timizing the use of knowledge by such actions as es
tablishing a relationship with program staff; distin
guishing between matters that must be forecast and
those that can be know; and distinguishing between the
near future, about which forecasters may have special
knowledge, and the distant future, about which they
know considerably less.
Trapnell raises considerable concern over data
used in Medicaid forecasting. This concern reflects a
lack of faith in Medicaid data and health care data in
general. Data concerns include completeness, reliabil
ity, validity and timeliness of data. He suggests several
methods of verifying data validity, by which he means
that the data is what it purports to be. Data can be
validated by reconciling with accounting records, by
examining the process of its production when produced
by the Medicaid agency, and by examining the docu
mentation of its production and meaning when pro
duced by others
Trapnell recommends the use of an analytic model
to assure that the forecast addresses all elements of ex
penditure. The model he recommends is a another
variant of the PUC model.
Trapnell lists nine special features of Medicaid
that make forecasting Medicaid expenditures harder
than other health care expenditure forecasting these
are:
1. Criteria for Medicaid eligibility are very complex.
2. Many beneficiaries are eligible and enrolled only
for short periods.
3. Some individuals become eligible for Medicaid in
part because they have high medical bills, so they
can be expected to continue to have high medical
bills.
4. Medicaid policy making leads to frequent changes
in payment levels.
5. Documentation of expenditures is incomplete
6. There are inconsistent definitions of data in ac
counting and claims processing.
7. There are constant changes in the program result
ing from federal and state legislation, new regula
tions, administrative initiatives, and court deci
sions.

8.

The political process leads to a random patterns of
interventions in payment rates and other program
features
9. Medicaid agencies need to be able to explain their
forecasts to officials and interest groups.
Consequently, he recommends that the Medicaid
forecast should:
1. Be easy to understand and test for reasonableness.
2. Be easy to adjust for changes.
3. Be easy to incorporate ad hoc adjustments.
4. Be easy and inexpensive to re-estimate using
newer data.
5. Be easy to change to accommodate program
changes.
6. Produce numerous outputs to compare with actual
experience.
7. Produce outputs that fulfill forecast users’ needs
Trapnell also recommends that:
• Medicaid forecasting methodology should be able
to detect frequent unexpected shocks to the expen
diture system;
• Forecasting should be insulated from political in
terference;
• Staff should be assigned to forecasting as their full
main work function, and
• The loss function that forecasters should minimize
is the consequences of forecast error. Trapnell as
sumes that there equally negative consequences for
positive and negative errors, thus, he recommends
a symmetrical loss function.
Trapnell does not recommend any specific fore
casting technique He recommends against the use of
complex econometric models or “black box” tech
niques, excessive reliance on high technology, or reli
ance on any single technology. Positive recommenda
tions include use of simple techniques, fitting tech
niques to the data and the nature of the problem, and
allocating resources for forecasting based on criteria of
importance and difficulty.
The National Association of State Budget Officers
(NASBO) issued a brief guideline on Medicaid estima
tion practices (National Association of State Budget
Officers, 1991). NASBO offers the general model:
“Simply put, a state’s expenditure on Medicaid is
the product of the number of people using its
services (caseload) and the cost of providing those
services (price). Several variables must be accu
rately forecast for the overall estimate to be cor
rect: the economic environment in which the
Medicaid program operates, the eligible popuia-
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tion, the types and prices of services used, the par
ticipation rate among eligible participants, policy
initiatives, and the federal match rate.
This guideline lists nine recommended practices:
Include the budget agency, the Medicaid agency,
and the legislative fiscal agency in the develop
ment of a Medicaid spending estimate. This is la
beled a “general practice” which sen es consensus
building.
Ensure that the economics of the spending esti
mate are consistent with those of the revenue esti
mate. This practice is of greater concern at turn
ing points when revenue and spending assump
tions may become disconnected.
Ensure that the population assumptions used in the
Medicaid estimate are consistent with overall state
demographic trends. Various state agencies
should communicate to assure that estimates of
related coverage groups are adequately coordi
nated.
Maintain good data. Recommended data elements
include users, their attributes, and the services they
use.
Establish the price of services before the fiscal year
begins. The aim is to remove uncertainty. “In
general, states will find it easier to develop accu
rate spending estimates if the cost of services is set
before the fiscal year begins. States that reimburse
for actual costs incurred are at a disadv antage in
this respect.”
Account for caseload changes associated with out
reach efforts. This concern involves the interac
tion between various programs and the possibility
that outreach for one program will affect another
program.
Track federal and state legislation and regulations
This practice concerns the frequent changes in
policies that affect Medicaid spending.
Know the federal match rate16 and the likelihood
of it changing. This concern involves the distri
bution of costs between federal and state govern
ments. Forecasting, in this sense, is oriented to
wards the costs to the state.
Monitor the estimate. Even good estimates can be
wrong. Medicaid agencies should produce

monthly or quarterly reports that compares Medi
caid spending with the original estimates. Devia
tions should be explained, so that forecasting can
improve over time.
Recommendations 2 and 3 may improve accuracy
if the facilitate communication between forecasters
who have different perspectives on the state economy.
Recommendation number 4 is similar to one of Trapnell's chief concerns, but Trapnell provides more ex
plicit advice concerning its implementation. Where
states are able to comply with recommendation number
5, they eliminate the need to forecast what they can
know. Recommendation number 6 appears to be idio
syncratic to particular concerns of the early 1990s;
however, it also seems to reflect Trapnell’s more gen
eral principle to maximize the use of know ledge.
HCFA, Trapnell and NASBO all show considerable
concern over the impacts of policy making as discussed
in recommendation 7. Recommendation number 8 in
volves monitoring, not forecasting. It also reflects
Trapnell’s principle to maximize use of knowledge.
The Congressional Budget Office uses of a model
similar to HCFA’s (Muse, 1993). Muse's concern is
not to describe the forecasting of the ongoing program,
but the method of estimating costs of program changes.
The particular changes he is concerned about involve
prev entive child health. He recommends the use of the
following model:17
AT=AC x AP x All + AA - O
where, A means “change in,” T is total payments, C is
population, P is price, U is utilization, A is adminis
trative costs or savings, and O is offsets. Muse’s nota
tion is confusing. If one assumes that AC, AP, and AU
are ratios'® as discussed by HCFA or Trapnell, then
this formula needs the modification of including the
base reimbursement in the right hand and the deletion
of the change symbol on the left hand side of the for
mula; let B| = the base expenditure level for medical
care and B: = the base expenditure level for admini
stration:
T=B| x (1+AC) x (1+AP) x (1+AU) + B: + AA - O
or
AT=B, x AC x AP x AU + AA - (O + B.)

“ "Match rate," is one o f several terms used to refer to the proportion of
Medicaid costs paid by the federal government Other terms are FMAP
rate, FFP, federal share, match, etc. This rate is published in themedera/ Register in January or February each year with an effective data of
the (o
following October 1. Federal Funding Information for Stales (FFIS),
an offshoot o f the NAS BO, monitors matching rates and forecasts
changes prior to their official publication in the Federal Register.

If one assumes that AC, AP, and AU arc numbers
' Notation is modified
11 AA would still be a fully dimensional number
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in their original dimensions, rather than ratios, then a
much more complex formula would be required:

pact - the beneficiary' of the offset may be someone
other than the entity who must make the cash outlay to
obtain the offset. In estimating and forecasting for
budgets, one must remain aw are of the cash outlay
consequences of forecasted events
Muse also observes that estimators should engage
in reality checking; that is, comparing calculated re
sults with the view s that people might expect in the
real world.

AT = AC x P x U + A P x C x U + AU x C x P +
AC x AP x AU + AA - O
where, C, P, and U are the population, price, and utili
zation levels after the policy change and AC, AP, and
AU arc the charges that led to these new levels.
Muse’s multiplication of changes by changes omits the
effect of changes on the base program, which is likely
to be the main effect of policy changes except in the
rare circumstance that new beneficiaries getting new
services and no old beneficiaries or old services are in
volved.
Muse’s formulation adds two important consid
erations, impact on administration and offsets. These
concerns are more pertinent with program changes
where administration may not already be provided for
and offsets may have a direct budgetary effect. Pre
sumably, when forecasting the ongoing program, ad
ministration is already included in the budget and can
be estimated directly. This principle is reflected in the
HCFA-37 form, which has a separate section for ad
ministrative expenses Offsets resulting from the base
program are reflected in the base and do not require
separate estimation
Muse also provides considerable discussion of data
quality. This discussion focuses on three data sources,
the Current Population Survey, the “Statistical Report
of Medical Care: Eligibles, Recipients, Payments, and
Services,” (also known as the HCFA-2082 report), and
the Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS).
Muse discusses the uses and weaknesses of these data
sources. This discussion is not specifically normative;
however, it exhibits the same sort of concern raised by
Trapnell and NASBO, the forecaster/estimator must
attend to data quality.
Of special concern for estimators of new policy
impacts is an estimate of participation level for newly
eligible individuals. For the base program, participa
tion level is not a significant issue except where forces,
such as outreach, might be changing this level. For
newly eligible individuals, the estimator needs to an
ticipate the degree to which this new population will
seek to obtain services. Muse says that this question is
not easily resolved.
Muse raises several objections to including esti
mates of offsets in projecting new program costs. Two
major reasons for this objection are (1) uncertainty evidence may be weak, elements of cost may be omitted
from calculation of offsets, etc.; and (2) lack of im

The Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commis
sion of the Virginia General Assembly (JLARC) has
reviewed Virginia's Medicaid forecasting in 1992 and
1997.19 In reports of these studies, JLARC recom
mends six criteria for forecast models and five criteria
for a forecasting process (1991; 1997). These criteria
are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
_______ Table 3: Criteria for Forecast Models_______
1. Model assumptions are clearly understood by par
ticipant and periodically reviewed.
2. Variables used in models' equations are sufficient,
accurately measured, and the best information avail
able at the time
3. Equations are mathematically sound and tested to
ensure mathematical precision
4. Different regional conditions are taken into account
sufficiently.
5. Forecast errors are analyzed on an ongoing basis
6. Forecast models are reviewed and documented well,
including any judgmental or policy adjustments______
Table 4: Criteria for Evaluating Forecasting Process
1. The degree of uncertainty' associated with forecasts
should be understood by process participants.
2. The agency making forecasts should have the data
and personnel required to generate a good estimate.
3. Regular reports on actual expenditures and their
variance from forecasts should be developed and avail
able to agency staff and interested external partici
pants, as appropriate.
4. The process should maintain the flexibility to re
spond to dramatic changes in recipient utilization and
program expenditures by revising the forecasts.
5. The process should include a mechanism requiring
some level of expanded review of the forecasts.
(Expanded review means review by people not in
volved in initial forecasting, such as an external panel

” (1) The author was the budget director at the agency that administers
Medicaid in Virginia in 1991. (2) Other slates have conducted similar
studies, however, there is no systematic method for finding such reports
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Excepting criterion 4 in Table 4, these criteria
might be applied to any forecasting problem. Most ap
pear to be a subset of more extensive criteria used in
evaluating revenue forecasting (Joint Legislative Audit
and Review Commission, 1991).
Many of these normative guidelines support the
goal of forecasting accuracy. For example, JLARC
recommends that formulae be valid and NASBO,
among many others, recommends the use of good data.
Yet, many other recommendations concern other mat
ters. For example. Trapnell recommends against unre
alistic expectations of forecast results; similarly JLARC
recommends that forecast participants should under
stand the degree of forecast uncertainty.
RELATION TO REVENUE FORECASTING
Revenue forecasting literature suggests a tendency
for an asymmetrical forecasting loss function, favoring
a cushion between total revenue and total expenditures
(Rodgers and Joyce, 1996). The rationale is that the
penalty for overestimated revenue is greater than the
penalty for underestimated revenue. Similar reasoning
would have states overestimate expenditures in major
expenditure categories such as Medicaid. Surpluses
are less damaging and, in many states, can be repro
grammed at the end of the fiscal year to offset deficits
elsewhere.
However, cushioning budgets through overestima
tion of Medicaid expenditures differs from underesti
mation of revenue in one important respect. It changes
the locus of control over the cushion. Unappropriated
revenue - which is the status of unexpected revenue
resulting from greater receipts than budgeted - is, gen
erally, controlled by the central administrative agencies
or the legislature. Over-appropriated funds, resultant
from appropriating funds to Medicaid agencies based
on overestimated forecasts, are controlled by line agen
cies. As there is a natural distrust between central ad
ministrative agencies and line agencies, it is unlikely
that states would intentionally allow line agencies to
control surplus funds.
Nevertheless, the line agencies, who submit the
HCFA-37, may be motivated to seek surplus funding as
a cushion against their own forecast error. There would
be no advantage for these line agencies to make sepa
rate lower estimates for HCFA
Trapnell argues that agencies might find differing
but equally negative consequences for overestimating
and underestimating expenditures. McKusick proposes
that there is lower penalty for underestimation. On the

other hand, Muse’s rationale for not counting offsets in
estimating program changes suggests a higher penalty
for underestimation.
The conflict concerning presence and direction of
bias can be explained by several factors. First, McKusick’s study reported in 1980 reflects a relatively small
Medicaid program. With this small program, political
decision making may be more important than financial
risk, as is also suggested in some of Trapnell’s discus
sion. In their effort to maximize their distribution of
benefits, elective officials may consider a small risk of
over expenditure to be less important than their ability
to distribute benefits to more people. Still, neither
McKusick or Trapnell found empirical evidence of ac
tual underestimation.
SOME HYPOTHESES
These studies provide little explanation of relative
forecasting accuracy. However, they are a source for
many hypotheses about Medicaid forecasting. In gen
eral these hypotheses are found by extrapolating the
objective of normative guidelines or the reasons for in
quiry in empirical studies. To a large degree, where
there is explanatory discussion, most of the views agree
with each other. In a few cases, as with the matter of
asymmetrical loss function, there is disagreement.
Where there is disagreement, the cited sources may not
all support the form of the hypothesis expressed here
Following are hypotheses that can be extracted from
this body of literature;
1.

2.

3.
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States'loss functions will be asymmetrical with a
preference for overestimation (Trapnell, McKu
sick, Muse). McKusick proposes a preference for
underestimation. Trapnell offers conflicting
views, (1) he argues that the political environment
equally punishes over- and underestimation, (2) he
points out that past federal behavior may create a
bias for overestimation, and (3) he proposes that
underestimation bias arises from frequent selection
of policy initiatives that are underestimated.
States manipulate fiscal year end results to im
prove forecasting results within state budgeting
By implication states whose fiscal year ends coin
cide with federal fiscal year ends will appear to be
more accurate (EOP, Trapnell, Insco).
Forecast models result in more accurate forecasts
when they :
a) Account for delivery of medical care on serv 
ice date with lagged transformation to cash
payment date (McKusick, Insco, Lower, Trap-

nell, Muse).
b) Decompose data into homogenous service and
enrollment categories (McKusick, Trapnell,
Lower).
c) Reflect the PUC model or an extended version
of the PUC model (HCFA, Trapnell, Muse,
NASBO).
d) Relate enrollment to economic conditions
(McKusick).
e) Relate service utilization with service supply
(McKusick).
f) Decompose series into baseline and policy
events (McKusick, Trapnell, Lower, EOP,
HCFA, NASBO, Muse, JLARC).
g) Decompose utilization into recipients per
beneficiary and units of service per recipient
(Lower).
h) Relate price estimates to price indexes (Lower,
Trapnell).
i) Account for federal matching rates (NASBO).
j) Account for regional variation (JLARC).
4. Forecasting accuracy is affected by:
a) Staff
i) Skill (EOP, Lower, JLARC).
ii) Quantity (McKusick, Lower, JLARC).
iii) Dedication to the forecasting function, as
opposed to part-time forecasting (Trap
nell).
b) Forecaster understanding of:
i) Forecast model assumptions (JLARC).
ii) The Medicaid program (Trapnell).
c) Forecaster access to program staff (Trapnell)
d) Data
i) Quality (McKusick, Trapnell, Lower,
NASBO, Muse. JLARC).
ii) Sources (Lower, Trapnell, Muse).
iii) Periodicity (monthly, etc ) (McKusick,
Lower).
iv) Series length (Lower).
e) Setting rates prior to forecasting (McKusick.
Trapnell, NASBO)
f) Composition of the Medicaid program (Mc
Kusick, Trapnell, Insco, Lower).
g) Update frequency (Trapnell, Lower).
h) Length of forecast horizon (Trapnell).
i) Decomposition of forecast into near future and
distant future (Trapnell).
j) Whether seasonality is examined (Lower).
k) Use of software:
i) Spreadsheets (Lower).
ii) Statistical software (Lower).
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iii) Forecast software (Lower).
l) Use of pre-forecast data editing (Trapnell),
m) Insulation of forecasting from politics (Trr.pnell).
n) Allocation of forecasting resources to prob
lems (components) according to difficulty and
importance (Trapnell).
o) Use and quality of forecast evaluation (Trap
nell, NASBO, JLARC).
Intra-govemmental forecasting factors that affect
forecasting accuracy include:
a) Locus of primary forecasting responsibility Medicaid agency or other state agency (Mc
Kusick, Lower).
b) Cooperation between forecasting bodies
(Lower. NASBO, JLARC).
c) Whether there is coordination between Medi
caid forecasting and other state forecasting
(NASBO).
d) Use of “expanded review” (JLARC).
Accuracy’ is improved when forecasting techniques
are:
a) Simple (Trapnell).
b) Not “black box” (Trapnell).
c) Fit to the nature of the problem (Trapnell).
d) Fit to the quality of the data (Trapnell).
e) Easy to use (Trapnell).
f) Capable of detecting the effects of policy
shocks (Trapnell)
Forecasting accuracy is not associated with the use
of any particular forecasting techniques (Trapnell).
However, McKusick suggests the opposite, imply
ing that more sophisticated techniques may result
in greater accuracy.
When multi-stage forecasts are used, accuracy of
later stage forecasts depend on the accuracy of
earlier stage forecasts (Trapnell).
Large policy events affect forecasting accuracy In
particular, forecasting accuracy is affected by:
a) Boren Amendment Lawsuits (Insco, Lower).
b) Federal policies concerning pregnant women
and children (Insco, Lower).
c) State initiatives involving Disproportionate
Share Hospitals (Trapnell, EOP).
Perceived forecasting importance affects accuracy
and bias. In particular:
a) The relative size of the Medicaid program to
other state programs affects accuracy. As the
program increases in relative size, accuracy
becomes more valued (McKusick, Lower)
McKusick does not offer this view, instead it

is implied in his observation of low concern
for accuracy in 1980, when Medicaid pro
grams were comparatively small components
of state budgets.
b) The centrality of forecast preparation to state
budgeting (McKusick, EOP). EOP observed
that states who prepare their federal budget
forecast in connection with their state budget
forecast appear to submit more accurate fed
eral forecasts. However, it is the current
author’s observation that this relationship may
be complex If state budget forecasting is bi
ased for political reasons, independent fore
casts may be more accurate.
c) The relative share of expenditures paid by
state funds, as compared with federal funds,
affects forecast accuracy (NASBO). Where
states pay a higher share - that is, have a
lower match rate - they will be seek greater
forecasting accuracy.
Table 5
States
Federal
Year UnwAvg CumAvg UnwAvg CumAvg
-4.7%
-4.7%
21.6%
21.6%
1982
1983
-5.0%
12.8%
17.2%
-5.3%
1984
29.7%
54.7%
-4.9%
-5.0%
1985
-3.6%
53.7%
35.7%
-4.6%
1986
-0.3%
-3.7%
-0.4%
28.5%
1987
8.1%
23.7%
-1.8%
-0.2%
1988
8.9%
21.7%
-0.2%
9.5%
1989
6.6%
0.6%
13.1%
20.6%
1990
8.4%
-2.8%
18.0%
1.5%
1991
23.8%
3.7%
43.9%
20.6%
1992
35.5%
6.6%
43.2%
22.6%
1993
6.8%
6.6%
24.6%
46.0%
1994
-6.2%
5.6%
78.1%
28.7%
1995
-1.5%
5.1%
7.9%
27.2%
UnwAvg. = Unweighted average
CumAvg. = Cumulative average.
Percent error 24 months prior to fiscal year end.
EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES
These hypotheses are too numerous to fully evalu
ate in this paper. Further, for many operationalization
may be problematic. The following discussion dis
cusses evidence concerning some of these hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: States will exhibit an asymmetrical
loss function w ith a preference for ov erestimation.

Analysis of this hypothesis is based on data from
the HCFA-37/HCFA-25 budget requests and the
HCFA-64 accounting records for the years 1982
through 1995. Ch er this period, the longest horizon
consistently available is 24 months before the end (12
months before the beginning) of the fiscal year. Data
are divided into two groups, one for the 50 states,20 and
another for the 6 federal districts and territories. Er
rors are analyzed using the percent error [(Actual mi
nus Forecast) divided by Actual]. As the forecast is
subtracted from the actual, a negative error means the
forecast exceeded actual expenditures.
As shown in Table 5, states have negative valued
errors in 7 of 14 years, and positive valued errors in the
remaining 7. Cumulatively, the error is negative for
the first 7 reported years, and positive for the remain
ing 7 years Table 6 shows that more than 50% of
states have negative errors in 6 years, while they have
positive errors in the 8; however, cumulative errors arc
negative in 8 of 14 years.

1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

Table 6
States
Federal
Cum % % <=0 Cum %
71.4%
71.4%
40.0%
40.0%
79.6%
75.5%
0 .0%
20.0%
74.0%
75.0%
20.0%
20.0%
75.8%
16.7%
19.0%
78.0%
69.8%
46.0%
83.3%
33.3%
39.4%
61.4% 66.7%
20 .0%
55.7%
16.7%
35.9%
22.0%
22 .0%
51.5%
33.3%
35.6%
39.2%
22.0%
48.2% 66.7%
38.6%
8.0%
44.2% 33.3%
16.7%
36.5%
4.0%
40.5%
38.0%
50.0%
37.7%
40.3%
0.0%
34.7%
80.0%
43.4%
62.0%
44.7%
0.0%
32.1%

These results appear to imply that state forecasting
of Medicaid expenditures is unbiased. However, this
understanding may be incorrect Medicaid has experi
enced differing phases of policy activity. During the
early 1980s, policy making activity was relatively low.
However, in the mid-1980s the federal government be
gan to engage in extensive Medicaid policy making,
including several expansions of eligibility for children
and pregnant women, welfare reform that expanded
20 Massachusetts has two distinct programs, these are combined in this
analysts.
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Medicaid eligibility, Medicare reform that extended
Medicaid eligibility to low income Medicare benefici
aries, and broadening of the minimum coverage re
quirements for children. In part, the states responded
to these changes by incorporating even more services
under Medicaid - off loading the cost of those services
from programs funded solely with state funds - and by
using provider tax and/or donation programs that have
the effect of increasing the effective federal share of
total program costs. Most such policy making resulted
in huge expenditure increases over very short horizons.
It is unlikely that these policies would be reflected in
forecasts discussed here.
Table 7 and Table 8 show comparative data at 12
months before the end of the fiscal year (the last fore
cast before any portion of the actual expenditures are
experienced), The number of years with positive and
negative errors is similar to those in Table 5 and Ta
ble 6 - 7 negative average errors and 7 positive
(Table 7); and 8 years with more than 50% of states
with negative errors and 6 with fewer than 50% (Table
8). However, the cumulative columns reveal a bias to
wards negative errors. Table 7 shows only 5 years in
which the cumulative errors are positive, as compared
with 9 years of negative cumulative errors. Table 8
shows only 1 year where the cumulative percent of
states with negative errors is below 50%. Over this 14
year period the cumulative percent of states with nega
tive forecasting errors is 53.3%.2'
These results are consistent with the broader view
that budget officials are risk averse Overestimation of
expenditures serves the same ends as underestimation
of revenue, to establish a cushion against higher risk
error. While errors that lead to surpluses may be
viewed unfavorably by those who could have allocated
funds to other purposes. The alternative of shortfalls
can lead to financial crisis. This analysis supports the
view that Medicaid forecasters are more averse to fi
nancial crisis.
It is interesting that these results are not found
with the federal districts and territories. These data
demonstrate a bias for underestimation. The un
weighted average forecast error for these six districts at
the beginning of fiscal years is positive for 10 of 14
years with the cumulative average error positive 13 of
14 years (Table 7). While there are an equal number
of years in which the majority of these districts make
negative and positive forecasts at this horizon, cumu
latively over 14 years, 47.6% of federal district fore31 This result may be affected by beginning arbitrarily in 1982, the first
year of data availability.

casts overestimate expenditures (Table 8). Federal
districts do not have the same bias towards overesti
mation as states, and they may be biased towards un
derestimation. No explanation of this alternative bias
is available at this time.
Table 7
States
Federal
Year UnwAvg CumAvg UnwAvg CumAvg
1982
-5.0%
-5.0%
-6.3%
-6.3%
1983
-2.1%
-3.5%
3.4%
13.0%
1984
-5.0%
-4.0%
33.3%
13.3%
1985
-2.0%
-3.5%
1.3%
10.3%
1986
0.2%
-2.8%
-4.0%
7.5%
1987
5.1%
-1.5%
0.6%
6.3%
1988
2.4%
-0.9%
6.7%
8.8%
1989
0.8%
-0.7%
~
.
-4.9%
5.2%
1990
2.9%
~.
-0.3%
-3.5%
4.3%
1991
0.9%
41.0%
11.5%
7.9%
1992
4.8%
1.2%
10.7%
38.5%
1993
-4.1%
0.8%
43.8%
13.5%
1994
-4.3%
0.4%
24.8%
14.3%
~.
1995
-0.1%
0.4%
13.4%
1.3%
UnwAvg. = Unweighted average.
CumAvg. = Cumulative average.
Percent error 12 months prior to fiscal year end.

Year
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

Table £
States
Federal
% <=0 Cum. % % <=0 Cum. %
75.5%
75.5% 80.0%
80.0%
20.0%
73.5%
74.5%
50.0%
88.0%
79.1% 16.7%
37.5%
58.0%
73.7% 33.3%
36.4%
52.0%
69.4% 83.3%
46.4%
30.0%
62.8% 66.7%
50.0%
36.0%
58.9% 33.3%
47.5%
42.0%
56.8% 66.7%
50.0%
34.0%
54.2% 66.7%
51.9%
22.0%
51.0% 33.3%
50.0%
28.0%
48.9% 16.7%
46.9%
84.0%
51.8% 50.0%
47.1%
70.0%
53.2% 16.7%
44.7%
54.0%
53.3% 83.3%
47.6%

Hypothesis 2: States manipulate fiscal year end ac
counting data to improve forecast outcomes.
State motivation for this practice rests with the fact
that, in the case of Medicaid, the forecast coincides
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with the budget. State officials may be motivated to
ensure that the actual expenditures coincide with
planned expenditures. In the case of Medicaid, ordi
nary fiscal management may not be sufficient to attain
such results Most Medicaid expenditures are made
through claims processing, not discretionary or quasi
discretionary expenditures. In most states, claims
processing is automated So, adjusting year end ex
penditures to match budget plans would involve caus
ing claims processing to accelerate or decelerate.
Medicaid programs are operated by state agencies.
Executives of these agencies are responsive to state of
ficials, including state governors and state legislators,
because they report to these officials. So, the motiva
tion to appear correct would be a feature of state budg
eting. There is no particular advantage of manipulat
ing expenditures reported to the federal government to
achiev e the illusion of forecast accuracy. Presumably,
the illusion is achieved by either delaying or acceler
ating payments in the last quarter of the fiscal year,
with a mirror image change in expenditures in the next
fiscal quarter. So, the illusion should appear in data
from those states whose fiscal year coincides with the
federal fiscal year, but should be absent from data with
other fiscal years
Table 9
Average
Error

States

Obs

States:
April
July
Combined
September
October
Combined

6.55%
6.54%
6.54%
4.45%
5.46%
5.12%

1
46
47
1
2
3

14
643
657
14
28
42

Federal Districts

20.9%

6

84

To evaluate this hypothesis absolute percent error
for each state are pooled across the 14 years and then
averaged within groups for each fiscal year end. Fed
eral districts are reported separately. The absolute er
ror is ev aluated because the direction of error is not at
issue. The errors are pooled because of the low number
of states whose fiscal year coincides with the federal
fiscal year. There are 46 states with fiscal years begin
ning in July, 1 beginning in April (New York), 1 be
ginning in September (Texas), and two beginning in
October (Michigan and Alabama). The federal fiscal

year begins in October. The pooled observations are
not independent, so no statistical analysis is attempted
For the 47 states with fiscal years beginning more
than a month off of the beginning of the federal fiscal
year, the average absolute error for 647 separate fiscal
years (Arizona is not reported for 1982) is 6.54%. If
Texas (fiscal year beginning in September) is included
with this group, the average drops to 6.50% For the
two states with fiscal years matching the federal fiscal
year, the average absolute error for 28 separate fiscal
years is 5.46%. If Texas is included with this group,
the average drops to 5.12%. Thus, the range of differ
ence between these errors is between 1.04% and 1 42%
depending on which group Texas is included with.
Thesc results weakly support the view that states ma
nipulate year end activities to create the illusion of
budgetary accuracy .
Hypothesis 3: Forecasts are more accurate w hen
forecast models more explicitly reflect the elements :
generating the forecasted series.
Data arc not available to ev aluate each of the 10
sub-hypotheses enumerated. However, two sub
hypotheses can be evaluated. The first sub-hypothesis
specifies that forecasts will be more accurate when
states explicitly account for the transformation between
service date and payment date. This sub-hypothesis is
evaluated using the pooled 14 year absolute forecast
errors as discussed with the second hypothesis. Identi
fication of states who explicitly account for service date
to payment date transformation is found in data deter
mined by Lower. Results are shown in Table 10. States
who focus on “payment date" do not attempt to evalu•
ate service date (accrual) events, while those who fore
cast “service date” do. (No federal districts are re
ported in the Lower study.) A third group of states
evaluate service date data some times. Based on these
pooled errors, there is no reason to anticipate that ac
counting for the service date events improves forecast
accuracy._____________________________
Table 10
Average States
Error
Payment Date
6.10%
28
Service Date
6.13%
9
Mixed
7.61%
6
However, it may be that the time period between
the earlier forecasts and the date of the Low er survey
invalidates the evaluation using these pooled errors
Table 11 shows comparable results with errors pooled
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Hypothesis 4: Forecast accuracy is affected by numerous specific technical elements
of the forecast.

from 1992 through 1995. As with Table 10, there is no
evidence that forecast models that account for service
date events are more accurate than those that do not.
Table 11
Average States
Error
5.75%
28
Payment Date
6.10%
9
Service Date
6.23%
6
Mixed
The third sub-hypothesis specifies that forecasts
made within the framework of the recommended PUC
model will be more accurate than those that are not.
This hypothesis is of special concern as HCFA requires
states to produce and submit data on the HCFA-37 that
reflects the PUC model, whether or not they use this
model. If the hypothesis is incorrect, states may be re
quired to conduct unnecessary analyses and forecasts
for the sole purpose of completing arduous paperw ork
required by HCFA.
The evaluation of this hypothesis is based on the
same 4 year pooled errors as used in Table 11. Identi
fication of states that use the PUC model is based on
preliminary data from a survey of state Medicaid agen
cies occurring in 1997. At the time of this paper, the
survey has received 35 responses out of 56 Medicaid
programs. Results are shown in Table 12. Based on
these results, there is no evidence that use of the PUC
model improves forecast accuracy.
Table 12
Average
Error
5.65%
Use PUC
Do not Use PUC
5.81%
8.97%
Federal

States
13
20
2

Hypothesis 4: Forecast accuracy is affected by nu
merous specific technical elements of the forecast.
Most aspects discussed here are still to be evalu
ated Figure 1 demonstrates the relationship between
forecast accuracy and time. Each line demonstrates the
change in forecast error over the period beginning with
the first forecast submitted to HCFA and ending with
the fiscal year end. Data do not always converge to
zero because the HCFA-37 was not required to match
the HCFA-64 (accounting data) for past periods prior
to 1992. It is not very surprising that forecasts become
more accurate as the forecast horizon diminishes. It is
interesting how little accuracy improves over time in
many years. The chart shows only minimal improve

ment in average error in forecasts for 1982 through
1986, 1994, and 1995. These results arise because of
relative accurate forecasts at the longest horizons. A
review of state specific data (not shown here) reveals
that accuracy in earlier periods arises from the cancel
lation of forecast errors between states, and that there
is a convergence towards forecast accuracy over time.
CONCLUSION
This paper is a interim report of research in prog
ress. The report shows that Medicaid forecast data can
be used to evaluate applied forecasting. Some tentative
conclusions include:
State forecasters use asymmetrical loss functions
in selecting forecasts to report. Forecasters are more
averse to underestimation of expenditures than to over
estimation.
Federal district and territory forecasters are not
averse to underestimation and may be averse to over
estimation.
States may manipulate fiscal year end activities to
ensure the accuracy of fiscal plans.
There is no evidence the explicitly accounting for
some details of data generating events - specifically,
the transformation between service date events and
payment date events - results in increased forecasting
accuracy.
There is no evidence that the HCFA recommended
Price x Utilization x Caseload model of data generation
produces more accurate forecasts.
Forecast accuracy' is associated with length of ho
rizon.
These results support the view that further analysis
of these data will generate other interesting findings
thni can improve the understanding of applied fore
casting.
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